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Abstract
Most instantiations of the inference ‘y; so if x, y’ seem intuitively odd, a phe-
nomenon known as one of the paradoxes of the material conditional. A common
explanation of the oddity, endorsed by Mental Model theory, is based on the in-
tuition that the conclusion of the inference throws away semantic information.
We build on this explanation to identify two joint conditions under which the in-
ference becomes acceptable: (a) the truth of x has bearings on the relevance of
asserting y; and (b) the speaker can reasonably be expected not to be in a position
to assume that x is false. We show that this dual pragmatic criterion makes ac-
curate predictions, and contrast it with the criterion defined by the mental model
theory of conditionals, which we show to be inadequate.
1 Introduction
One well-known ‘paradox’ of the material conditional consists of accepting that
‘if x, y’ follows from y by a valid rule of inference. This inference is deemed
paradoxical because most of its instantiations in natural language are intuitively
odd. For example:
(1) ?Today is Monday; so, if it is snowing outside, today is Monday.1
Importantly, though, other instantiations of the inference appear intuitively ac-
ceptable, for example:
(2) Viv did not play soccer; so, if she played a game, Viv did not play soccer.
This fact is given prominent importance in one major psycholinguistic theory of
conditionals, mental model theory (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002). One critical
argument commonly advanced in favor of the mental model theory of condition-
als is its ability to predict which instantiations of the paradoxical inference seem
1All through this article, we will use the formulation ‘if x, y’ for conditionals, and the for-
mulation ‘y; so if x, y’ for the paradoxical inference. Natural language offers a number of other
possible formulations of the conditional. Some of these formulations strengthen or weaken the
paradox (e.g., ‘if x then y’ and ‘even if x, y’, respectively) to the point where it becomes imprac-
tical to generate acceptable or unacceptable examples, respectively. We settle on the formulation
that apparently offers the greatest flexibility for the purpose of generating acceptable and unaccept-
able examples. We content ourselves with noting that the linguistic formulation of the conditional
is a factor in the acceptability of the paradoxical inference, whose interaction with our variables
of interest is left for future research.
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acceptable, and why. The mental model account of the paradox remains contro-
versial, though (Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Girotto, 2009; Politzer, 2007, 2009),
and is still waiting for a systematic assessment. In this article, we contrast the
mental model account of the paradox to our own pragmatic account. We show
that the mental model criterion is neither necessary nor sufficient to predict the
acceptability of the paradoxical inference, which is adequately predicted by our
dual pragmatic criterion.2 While we focus on mental model theory in the course
of the article, we will also discuss the contribution of our analysis to other psy-
chological theories of natural language conditionals, which have more drastically
distanced themselves from interpreting the conditional as a material implication.
In Section 2, we introduce the mental model account and its criterion for the
acceptability of the paradoxical inference, which we express as a binary condition
that we call condition m. In Section 3, we introduce the fundamental hypothesis
underlying our pragmatic account. In a nutshell, we argue that a conditional sen-
2The paradox that we address in this article is usually presented alongside with a second para-
dox, that of inferring ‘if x, y’ from ‘¬x’. We will not address this second paradox in the present ar-
ticle. We believe that the acceptability of these paradoxical inferences is determined by pragmatic,
conversational principles; and that the conversational principles that govern the acceptability of
the first inference do not necessarily govern the acceptability of the second. Since we do not be-
lieve in a single, unified theory of the acceptability of both paradoxical inferences, we do not feel
compelled to offer one. Mental model theory does offer a unified account of the two paradoxes,
but this unified account is necessarily incorrect if, as we intend to show, it fails on at least one of
the paradoxes. Finally, we note that although it offers a unified theory of both paradoxes, mental
model theory restricts itself to the first paradox when it comes to offering examples of acceptable
instantiations.
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tence ‘if x, y’ uttered in the context of y, or asserted as following from y, seems
odd when the speaker is asserting that y is unconditionally true, and then that the
truth of x has bearings on the truth of y. The paradox should disappear, then, when
the conditional does not express that the truth of x has bearings on the truth of y,
but rather that the truth of x has bearings on the relevance of asserting y (where
relevance can derive from epistemic utility or practical utility).
This hypothesis leads us to predict the dissolution of the paradox from a dual
criterion that we express under the form of two binary conditions p1 and p2. In
Section 4, we examine the eight possible cases that correspond to the satisfaction
(or non-satisfaction) of the binary conditions m, p1, and p2. We show that the
paradox disappears only when p1 and p2 are both satisfied (including the case
wherem is not satisfied), and remains in all other cases (including the cases where
m is satisfied).
Before we proceed, we wish to exclude one specific case from our analyses,
that of when y is known to be false. It is correct that the inference from ⊥ to ‘if
x then ⊥’ (where ⊥ denotes the contradiction) is both logically valid and intu-
itively odd, and could thus be considered as a regular case of the paradox. The
logical validity of this inference, though, is unrelated to the interpretation of the
conditional, and is rather due to the ex falso quodlibet principle of classical logic.
Anything follows validly from ⊥, including indeed ‘if x then ⊥.’ In this article,
we are interested in a paradox that arises from the interpretation of the conditional,
and not in the paradoxes that arise from the ex falso quodlibet principle; and we
will accordingly discard that case from our subsequent analyses.
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2 The Mental Model Account
The mental model theory of conditionals (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991, 2002)
assumes that the paradoxical inference is counterintuitive because it throws away
semantic information: That is, the conditional ‘If x, y’ introduces a possibility
that was ruled out by the original premise y. Consider for example the premise
‘Today is Monday.’ From this premise, it would seem anomalous to infer that ‘If
we have pasta for lunch today is Monday’:
(3) ?Today is Monday; so, if we have pasta for lunch, today is Monday.
According to the mental model theory, the conditional ‘If we have pasta for
lunch then today is Monday’ refers to three possibilities:
pasta for lunch today is Monday
no pasta for lunch today is Monday
no pasta for lunch today is not Monday
The reason why (3) is counterintuitive, according to the mental model account, is
because the third possibility above,< no pasta for lunch, today is not Monday >
was ruled out by the original premise ‘Today is Monday.’ More generally, the in-
ference ‘y; so if x, y’ is intuitively anomalous because < ¬x,¬y > is a model of
the conditional, while ¬y was ruled out by the original premise y. Inferring the
conditional from this premise would amount to throwing away semantic informa-
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tion.3
The mental model account then makes a clear prediction about when individu-
als will readily endorse the paradox. If common knowledge rules out < ¬x,¬y >
as a model of ‘If x, y’, then the inference ‘y; so if x, y’ should seem accept-
able, because it no longer throws away semantic information. Let us define this as
‘condition m’:
Definition 1 (Condition m). The inference ‘y; so if x, y’ is intuitively acceptable
if and only if (m) the possibility < ¬x,¬y > is ruled out by common knowledge
and thus cannot be a model of the conditional ‘If x, y’.
The definition above indicates that m is a necessary and sufficient condition
for the intuitive acceptability of the inference. This characterisation is consistent
with the most recent exposition of the mental model account (Johnson-Laird et al.,
2009), which states both the sufficient and the necessary parts of the condition:
[Sufficiency] In what cases, should individuals accept a ‘paradox’ immedi-
ately [. . . ] ? The model theory answers with a clear prediction: when the
conclusion does not add a disjunctive alternative in which the premise fails
to hold. (p. 78)
[Necessity] The crux is simple: if the conclusion of a valid inference throws
information away by adding a disjunctive alternative to the possibilities con-
3Mental model theory offers the same explanation of why the inference from x to the disjunc-
tion x or y can feel intuitively anomalous: One model of the disjunction is < ¬x, y >, which was
ruled out by the original premise x.
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sistent with the premises, then it should seem odd, and individuals should
balk at it. The challenge to critics is to find a counterexample. (p. 78)4
Let us now illustrate the workings of condition m with Conditional (4):
(4) If Viv played a game, Viv did not play soccer.
The model < ¬game, soccer > cannot be part of the representation of (4), be-
cause it is semantically inconsistent: one cannot play soccer without playing a
game. Therefore, the models of (4) are:
game ¬soccer
¬game ¬soccer
Because none of these models contains soccer, the inference (5) should not
seem anomalous:
(5) Viv did not play soccer; so, if Viv played a game, Viv did not play soccer.
And indeed, (5) does not sound as odd as (3). The fact that the mental model
account could generate an acceptable instance of the paradox is an impressive
4Although this last quote unambiguously expresses the necessity of condition m, we ack-
owledge the possibility that it might have gone beyond the intention of the authors, who did not
construe m as a necessary condition for the acceptability of the inference. If this is the case, then
the mental model account does not make any prediction as to whether the paradox appears when
condition m is violated, and thus does not make any prediction in four of the eight cases that we
will review in the rest of this article. Our own account still does, of course.
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feat, which speaks powerfully for the account. In the rest of this article, though,
we are going to claim that the mental model account of the paradox is incorrect.
We will show that condition m is neither necessary nor sufficient to make ‘y; so
if x, y’ an intuitively acceptable inference; and we will offer as a replacement a
pragmatic account which will predict when and why the paradox disappears.
3 The Pragmatic Account
The fundamental idea behind the mental model account is that it is a waste of
information to derive the less informative conclusion ‘If x, y’ from the more in-
formative premise y. This idea concurs with our basic hypothesis presented in
the introduction. Pragmatically speaking, the inclusion of the conditional in (6) is
bound to be a waste of the listener’s time and attention:
(6) ?I had bacon this morning; so, if I had juice, I had bacon this morning.
In the language of relevance theory (Sperber & Wilson, 1986/1995), the second
part of the statement requires additional processing effort that does not deliver
additional cognitive effects.5 Generally speaking, when y is already asserted as
unconditionally true, no additional information is communicated by asserting that
5Our intention is not to introduce neo-Gricean pragmatics as a general alternative to mental
model theory. We are agnostic about the general level of consistency between mental model theory
and neo-gricean pragmatics. Nevertheless, the account of the paradox that we offer in this article
does derive from Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatics, and is in this specific case pitted against
the mental model account.
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the truth of x has bearings on the truth of y.
It is not always the case, though, that a statement of the form ‘If x, y’ expresses
that the truth of x has bearings on the truth of y. Some conditionals express instead
that the truth of x has bearings on the relevance of the assertion that y. This
is typically the case in ‘biscuit’ conditionals (Austin, 1970; DeRose & Grandy,
1999; Siegel, 2006):
(7) a. There are biscuits on the sideboard if you want them;
b. If you are thirsty now, there are beers in the fridge;
c. If you need help, my name is Bob.
Clearly, Bob does not mean by (7-c) that the listener’s need for help has bear-
ings on whether his own name is Bob. What Bob means is rather that whether the
listener needs help has bearings on the relevance of asserting that his own name
is Bob. Similarly, the speaker who is uttering (7-b) means that whether the lis-
tener is thirsty has bearings on whether it would be relevant to assert that there are
beers in the fridge. Note now that the felicity of these interpretations requires that
the speaker is not in a position to assume that the antecedent of the conditional is
false. This condition accounts for the difference between (8-a) and (8-b):
(8) a. If you are thirsty now, there are beers in the fridge;
b. ?If I am thirsty now, there are beers in the fridge.
We have claimed so far that a conditional ‘If x, then y’ does not always express
that the truth of x has bearings on the truth of y, as some conditionals express
8
instead that the truth of x has bearings on the relevance of asserting y. We now
note that the relevance of asserting y can derive either from the basic epistemic
utility of learning that y, or additionally from the practical utility of knowing that
y.
In example (7-a-c), the relevance of asserting y derives from the practical util-
ity this information has for the listener. Indicating the whereabouts of the beers,
for example, would have practical utility for a listener whose goal is to quench her
thirst. Accordingly, (7-b) expresses that the listener’s thirst has bearings on the
practical relevance of asserting that there are beers in the fridge. In other cases,
the relevance of asserting y derives from the mere epistemic utility of learning
that y. This happens when there is no immediately manifest goal of the listener
that would be served by knowing that y, bar the generic goal of augmenting one’s
knowledge about the world. Consider for example:
(9) If you’ve not seen Amy yet, she’s dyed her hair red.
Conditional (9) does not, of course, express that whether the listener has seen
Amy has bearings on the fact that Amy dyed her hair red. It rather expresses
that whether the listener has seen Amy already, has bearings on the relevance
of asserting that Amy dyed her hair red. Indicating that Amy has dyed her hair
red would have epistemic utility for a listener who would not already be in a
possession of this piece of knowledge, typically because this listener would not
have seen Amy already.6
6One could imagine contexts wherein knowing that Amy dyed her hair red would have prac-
tical utility for the listener in addition to epistemic utility, and such contexts would make other
9
Once again, the felicity of this interpretation would be compromised if the
speaker was in a position to assume that the antecedent of the conditional is false,
which accounts for the difference between (10-a) and (10-b):
(10) a. If you’ve not seen Amy yet, she’s dyed her hair red;
b. ?If we’ve not seen Amy yet, she’s dyed her hair red.
We are now in a position to get back to the paradox. We have remarked that the
statement ‘y; so if x, y’ is pragmatically incongruous when it expresses that the
truth of x has bearings on the truth of y. Exploiting the remarkable case of biscuit
conditionals, we have pointed out, however, that the conditional ‘If x, y’ can have
pragmatic import over and above the assertion that y, when it expresses that the
truth of x has bearings on the relevance of asserting y. In line with Gricean and
neo-Gricean pragmatics, we have shown further that this pragmatic import can be
obtained when the relevance of asserting y derives from its epistemic utility for
the listener, or from its practical utility for the listener; and that it requires that the
speaker can plausibly ignore whether x is false. We suggest that the statement ‘y;
so if x, y’ is pragmatically acceptable when these conditions are met, and we thus
suggest replacing condition m with conditions p1 and p2:
Definition 2 (Conditions p1 and p2). The inference ‘y; so if x, y’ is intuitively
acceptable if and only if (p1) the truth of x has bearings on the relevance of as-
serting y ; and (p2) the speaker can reasonably be expected not to be in a position
antecedents appropriate. For example, ‘If you placed a bet on Amy’s new hair colour, she’s dyed
her hair red.’
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to assume that x is false.
4 Teasing Out the Two Accounts
In order to tease out the mental model account and the pragmatic account, we
must review the eight cases defined by the satisfaction or violation of conditions
m, p1, and p2. As displayed in Table 1, there are four cases wherein the two
accounts make similar predictions, two critical cases wherein they make different
predictions, and two special cases that cannot be constructed due to the logical
relation between condition m and condition p1, which we will address later on.
4.1 Cases of Agreement
When all three conditions m, p1, and p2 are met, both accounts naturally predict
that the statement ‘y; so if x, y’ sounds acceptable. This is Case 8 of Table 1. The
classic example offered by the mental model account falls in this category:
(11) Viv did not play soccer; so, if she played a game, Viv did not play soccer.
Conditionm is met because the possibility< ¬x,¬y >, here< ¬game, soccer >,
is ruled out by common knowledge about the semantics of ‘game’ and ‘soccer.’
Condition p1 requires that the truth of x has bearings on the epistemic or prac-
tical relevance of asserting y. It is clearly the case here that if x were known to
be false (i.e., if Viv was known not to have played any game), the assertion of
11
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y (she did not play soccer) would have no epistemic relevance.7 Example (11)
thus meets condition p1 of the pragmatic account, one quick test of which is to
tentatively add ‘at all’ to the antecedent of the conditional, as in (12):
(12) Viv did not play soccer; so, if she played a game at all, Viv did not play
soccer.
Finally, (12) gives no indication that the speaker might be in a position to assume
that Viv did not play a game, thus satisfying condition p2.
So far, we have only addressed one case of agreement between the two ac-
counts, wherein they both predict the paradox to vanish. Table 1 also displays
three cases wherein both accounts predict that ‘y; so if x, y’ is intuitively incon-
gruous. Case 1 denotes situations that violate all three conditions m, p1, and p2,
as in (13):
(13) ?I took an aspirin; so, if I had a headache, I took an aspirin.
Condition m is violated because the possibility < ¬headache,¬aspirin > is
entirely consistent with common knowledge. Condition p1 is violated because the
informational or practical value of asserting ‘I took an aspirin’ does not depend
7The fact that y contains a negation is not alien to the appeal of example (11). Because they
cannot spend their time denying everything they know to be false, people are especially sensitive
to the pragmatic presuppositions required for negations to make conversational sense. For condi-
tional reasoning experiments capitalising on these pragmatic presuppositions, see Bonnefon and
Villejoubert (2007).
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in any immediately salient way on the fact that I had a headache. Condition p2 is
violated because I, the speaker, am in a position to know for a fact whether I did
not have a headache prior to taking the aspirin.
Case 2 denotes situations wherein condition m and p1 are violated, although
condition p2 is satisfied, as in (14), where nothing indicates that the speaker might
assume that the exam was in fact hard:
(14) ?Nate passed the exam; so, if the exam was easy, Nate passed the exam.
Finally, Case 3 denotes situations where conditionm and p2 are violated, although
condition p1 is satisfied, as in (15):
(15) ?This child is crying; so, if she’s ours, this child is crying.
Condition m is violated because it is clearly possible that a child who is not that
of the speaker and the listener is not crying. Condition p1 is met because whether
the child is that of the listener clearly has bearings on the practical relevance of
asserting that the child is crying: The listener plausibly has the general goal of
monitoring the well-being of her child, but not as plausibly that of monitoring the
well-being of other parents’ children. Finally, condition p2 is violated because
the speaker should know whether the crying child is his. Note now the difference
between (15) and (16):
(16) This child is crying; so, if she’s yours, this child is crying.
14
Example (16) does not sound as odd as example (15), for reasons that the prag-
matic account can explain, but that elude the mental model acccount. It reflects
one of the critical cases that we will scrutinize in the next section.
4.2 Critical Cases
There are two critical cases wherein the mental model account and the pragmatic
account make opposite predictions. In case 4, both conditions p1 and p2 are met,
but condition m is violated. Accordingly, the model account predicts that‘y; so
if x, y’ sounds unacceptable, whereas the pragmatic account predicts that ‘y; so
if x, y’ sounds acceptable. Conversely, in case 7, condition m is met, and so
is condition p1, but condition p2 is violated. Accordingly, the pragmatic account
predicts that ‘y, so if x then y’ is incongruous, whereas the model account predicts
that it is acceptable.
We first consider case 4, of which (17-a-c) are three examples:
(17) a. Amy dyed her hair red; so, if you’ve not seen her yet, Amy dyed her
hair red;
b. This child is crying; so, if she’s yours, this child is crying.
c. There is beer in the fridge; so, if you want some, there is beer in the
fridge.
In all these examples, the model < ¬x,¬y > is perfectly consistent with world
knowledge, and is thus part of the representation of the conditional ‘if x, y.’ In-
deed, there is nothing intrinsically implausible, let alone impossible, with the situ-
15
ations captured by the model< ¬x,¬y >: Amy, whose hair is not dyed red, being
seen by someone; a child who is not crying, and who is not that of a listener; a
fridge that is devoid of beers, at a moment someone has no desire for beers.
Thus, the possibility < ¬x,¬y > has to be part of the representation of the
conditionals featured in (17-a-c), and the conditional ‘If x, y’ is bound to throw
away semantic information as compared to the premise ‘y.’ As a consequence,
the mental model account predicts that all three examples (17-a-c) should sound
incongruous and unacceptable. Clearly, this prediction is not supported by our
intuitive reaction to these examples.
The pragmatic account, in contrast, predicts examples (17-a-c) to be accept-
able, because they all meet conditions p1 and p2. In (17-a), whether the listener
has seen Amy already, has bearings on the epistemic relevance of asserting that
Amy dyed her hair red. In (17-b), whether the child is that of the listener has
bearings on the practical relevance of asserting that the child is crying. Likewise,
in (17-c), whether the listener is thirsty has bearings on the practical relevance of
asserting that there is beer in the fridge. Thus, condition p1 is satisfied in all three
examples.
In parallel, condition p2 is also satisfied in the three examples. Nothing in
example (17-a) indicates that the speaker is in a position to know or assume that
the listener did not see Amy already; and, mutatis mutandis, the same can be
said about examples (17-b-c). Because conditions p1 and p2 are met for all three
examples (17-a-c), the pragmatic account (correctly) predicts that they should be
intuitively acceptable.
We now turn to case 7 in Table 1, wherein condition m is met, as well as
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condition p1, but not condition p2. In such a situation, the model account predicts
that we should not flinch at the statement ‘y; so if x, y,’ whereas the pragmatic
account predicts the opposite. Now consider (18):
(18) ?I am not pregnant; so, if I am a woman I am not pregnant.
Condition m is unambiguously met by example (18). Indeed, the model <
¬woman, pregnant > is ruled out by common knowledge, and is not part of the
representation of ‘If I am a woman I am not pregnant.’ Thus, the conditional
does not throw away information as compared to the premise ‘I am not pregnant,’
and (18) should not sound incongruous according to the model account. The
oddness of (18), though, is beyond reasonable doubt. The pragmatic account
predicts this oddness, based on the violation of condition p2, i.e., based on the
common expectation that speakers are in a position to know for a fact about their
gender. In contrast, p2 is satisfied if one changes (18) minimally into (19):
(19) This person is not pregnant; so, if this person is a woman, she is not
pregnant.
Accordingly, and as predicted, (19) is not incongruous. Note that condition p1 of
the pragmatic account is met by examples (18) and (19), because the statement
‘I am not pregnant’ would have no epistemic relevance if the speaker was not a
woman; and mutatis mutandis for (19). As we have hinted on several occasions,
the satisfaction of p1 is in fact entailed by the satisfaction of m. We turn to that
issue in the next section, where we consider the last two, special cases in Table 1,
17
which cannot be constructed due to the logical relation between m and p1.
4.3 Special Cases
Table 1 does not report any prediction of either account for cases 5 and 6. The
specificity of these two cases is that they denote situations wherein condition m
is satisfied whilst condition p1 is not. These situations, however, cannot occur,
and cases 5 and 6 cannot be constructed, because the satisfaction of condition m
entails that condition p1 is satisfied, too.
Let us assume that condition m is satisfied, i.e., that < ¬x,¬y > is ruled
out by common knowledge as a model of ‘If x, y.’ That is, common knowledge
dictates that x and y cannot be simultaneously false: one at least must be true. In
such a case, the truth of x is bound to have bearings on the epistemic relevance of
asserting y, for this epistemic relevance is null when x is false. This entails, by
definition, the satisfaction of p1.
Note that, in contrast, the satisfaction of p1 does not entail the satisfaction of
m. This was already illustrated by agreement case 3 and critical case 4, in which
p1 was satisfied because the truth of x had bearings on the practical (rather than
epistemic) relevance of asserting y. It is not entirely clear, though, whether mental
model theory has the same position on that issue, as one paragraph in Johnson-
Laird and Byrne (2002) may suggest otherwise. In the course of discussing how
the semantic contents of a conditional, as well as the context of its utterance,
can block the construction of some possibilities, Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002)
define what they call the ‘relevance’ interpretation of a conditional:
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The relevance interpretation. Content or context precludes the possibility
in the conditional interpretation in which the consequent does not occur.
Typical examples occur when the antecedent asserts merely a condition to
which the consequent may be relevant, for example, “If you are interested
in Vertigo, then it is on TV tonight.” Individuals know that the antecedent
possibility has no bearing on the occurrence of the consequent, and so the
consequent holds in any case. (page 662)
This definition may be read as suggesting that the possibility < ¬x,¬y > is
discarded when x is a condition to which y may be relevant (or more precisely, we
believe, the assertion of y). Thus, this definition may be interpreted as suggesting
that p1 entails m. What is not clear, under closer examination of the paragraph
above, is why this should be the case. The crux of the definition is that individuals
come to the assumption that y holds in any case, based on some feature of the con-
ditional: Either that ‘the antecedent possibility has no bearing on the occurrence
of the consequent’ or that ‘the antecedent asserts merely a condition to which the
consequent may be relevant’. None of these two possibilities stands correct upon
closer examination.
First, one cannot come to the conclusion that y holds in any case (whether
or not x is the case) from the assertion that ‘if x, y’ and the belief that x has no
bearing on the occurrence of y. That would be a recipe for disaster:
(20) a. If we have pasta on Monday, the Mafia has weapons of mass de-
struction.
b. If it is cold on Tuesday, it is a good idea to put all our money in the
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stock market.
Clearly, we are not ready to conclude that the Mafia has weapons of mass de-
struction whether or not we have pasta on Monday, simply because we know that
having pasta on Monday has no bearing on the Mafia having weapons of mass
destruction.
Second, the fact that x is a condition to which the assertion of y is relevant
cannot be taken as a guarantee that y is true whether or not x. This point is treated
in great detail by Siegel (2006), who offers in particular the following example:
(21) If you want to hear a big fat lie, George W. and Condi Rice are secretly
married.
Example (21) is a perfectly acceptable conditional, whose antecedent asserts merely
a condition to which the assertion of its consequent is relevant, and whose an-
tecedent has no bearing on the occurrence of the consequent. Nonetheless, it does
not lead people to assume that George W. and Condi Rice are secretly married no
matter what.
Note that a serious problem arises from the very idea that the context in which
the conditional is uttered might block the possibility < ¬x,¬y >. Quite uncon-
troversially, the context of a conditional includes what has been uttered just before
the conditional itself was asserted. Let us suppose that y is asserted just before ‘if
x, y’ is asserted. Because y is part of the context of the assertion that ‘if x, y’,
context precludes that < ¬x,¬y > is included in the interpretation of the condi-
tional. As a consequence, ‘if x then y’ does not throw away semantic information
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as compared to y. Therefore, on the own terms of mental model theory, allowing
for the contextual blocking of < ¬x,¬y > implies that every instantiation of the
paradoxical inference should become acceptable.
This being pointed out, whether or not the mental model characterisation of
‘relevance’ conditionals should be fixed or abandoned is not a question we can
solve in this article. Our aim was rather to note that, under a superficial read-
ing, mental model theory might be taken as suggesting that condition p1 entailed
condition m; but that there was no solid ground for that reading of the theory.
5 Biscuits and Paradoxes
In developing our dual pragmatic criterion, we have capitalised on the character-
istics of ‘biscuit’ conditionals. In this section, we consider the possibility that all
disappearances of the paradox may be imputable to the use of a biscuit condi-
tional, and the related possibility that there does not exist any true exception to
the paradox.8
We have argued that the absence of the paradox entails that p1 is satisfied:
The truth of x has bearings on the relevance of asserting y. The question is, now,
whether the satisfaction of p1 entails that the conditional ‘if x, y’ is of the biscuit
variety. Let us consider two diagnostic tests used to distinguish normal condi-
tionals from biscuit conditionals (DeRose & Grandy, 1999). The first consists of
checking whether the question ‘And what if ¬x ?’ makes sense upon hearing ‘if
x, y’ ; the second test consists of checking whether the contraposition ‘if ¬y, ¬x’
8The arguments in this section owe greatly to one anonymous referee.
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makes any sense.
For all the conditionals in this article that satisfy p1, the answer to both ques-
tions is ‘No’. For example:
(22) a. If you’ve not seen Amy yet, she’s dyed her hair red.
b. ?And what if I have seen her?
c. ?If Amy has not dyed her hair red, you have seen her already.
(23) a. If Viv played a game, Viv did not play soccer.
b. ?And what if Viv did not play a game?
c. ?If Viv played soccer, she did not play a game.
Based on these diagnostics, it could be tempting to consider that all conditionals
that satisfy p1 qualify as biscuit conditionals. This conclusion, however, might
be hasty. What is indisputable is that these conditionals do not qualify as normal
conditionals; what is disputable is whether this makes them biscuit conditionals.
While (22-a) and (23-a) both fail the question test and the contraposition test, they
seem to do so for qualitatively different reasons.
More precisely, (23-a) fails both tests for semantic reasons. The fact that ¬y
is known to entail x (soccer is a game) is responsible for the incongruity of asking
whether y would be true if x was false, and also for the incongruity of asserting
that ¬y entails ¬x. No comparable semantic reasons can account for the fact that
(22-a) fails both tests. It is an open question whether we should call (23-a) a bis-
cuit conditional on the grounds that it fails the question test and the contraposition
test, even though it does so for semantic reasons. If we make that choice, then
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the disappearance of the paradox (and thus the satisfaction of p1) does entail the
fact that the conditional is a biscuit; and the disappearance of the paradox can be
added to the linguist’s toolbox for diagnosing biscuit conditionals.
If really the disappearance of the paradox always involves a biscuit condi-
tional, or a close cousin such as (23-a), then the possibility arises that there exists
no true exception to the paradoxical character of ‘y; so if x, y.’ One agreed-upon
characteristic of biscuit conditionals is that their consequents do not merely trans-
late as the proposition they express. That is, the consequent y in a biscuit ‘if x,
y’ is a different semantic object from an independent occurrence of the same sen-
tence ‘y’ (Siegel, 2006). Hence, the biscuit version of the argument ‘y; so if x,
y’ might only have the superficial appearance of the paradox, but not its structure,
for its structure would more appropriately be noted as ‘y1; so if x, y2’.
Thus, if all acceptable instances of the paradox involve biscuit, or biscuit-like
conditionals; if specifically all these conditionals are such that their consequent
is interpreted as a different semantic object than the independent occurrence of
the same sentence; then the conclusion may be reached that there does not exist
any true exception to the paradox, once the apparent exceptions are described at
an appropriate level of semantic detail. This speculation, though, is left for future
linguistic inquiry and not addressed further in this article, for it does not bear on
our primarily psycholinguistic purposes.
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6 Final Words
We have offered a pragmatic account of when and why the inference from y to
‘if x, y’ is paradoxical. We have shown that even though mental model theory
(Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 2002) explains the oddity of the paradox in terms of
loss of semantic information, the way the explanation is operationalised in terms
of mental models is inadequate, as the condition so formulated is neither necessary
nor sufficient to explain the appearance and disappearance of the paradox.
In this article, we have focused on the mental model account as a contrast to
our own pragmatic account. Mental model theory has a special burden of explain-
ing the paradox, because the ‘core meaning’ it assigns to the natural language con-
nective ‘if’ is akin to the material conditional. Theories that do not endorse that
interpretation of ‘if’, however, do not necessarily endorse as valid the inference
from y to ‘if x, y’, and do not share the burden of explaining the paradox. Indeed,
the paradoxes of material implication have always been, and remain, a part of the
motivation for other accounts of conditionals, such as the Stalnaker-Lewis pos-
sible words semantics (Stalnaker, 1968), or psycholinguistic approaches (derived
from philosophical work by, e.g., Adams, 1975; Edgington, 1995) such as the
Bayesian account (Oaksford & Chater, 2001, 2007) or the Suppositional account
(Evans, 2007; Evans & Over, 2004). These two major psycholingustic approaches
allow a conditional ‘If x, y’ to be uncertain, assigning it the conditional probabil-
ity Pr(y|x). Because the probability of the conditional ‘If x, y’ (the conclusion
of the inference) may be smaller than that of y (the premise of the inference), the
inference from y to ‘If x, y’ is not valid, which accounts for its intuitive oddity.
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However, a case of interest is that in which the premise y is certain. In that case,
‘If x, y’ must also be certain, and the inference is valid. This specific case re-
mained to be accounted for by probabilistic approaches to conditionals; they can
now rely on our pragmatic account.
References
Adams, E. 1975: The logic of conditionals: An application of probability to
deductive logic. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Austin, J. L. (1970) Ifs and cans. In Philosophical papers (2nd ed., pp. 205–32).
Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Bonnefon, J. F., & Villejoubert, G. (2007) Modus Tollens, Modus Shmollens:
Contrapositive reasoning and the pragmatics of negation. Thinking and Rea-
soning, 13, 207–22.
DeRose, K., & Grandy, R. E. (1999) Conditional assertions and “biscuit” condi-
tionals. Noûs, 33, 405–20.
Edgington, D. (1995) On conditionals. Mind, 104, 235–329.
Evans, J. St. B. T. 2007: Hypothetical thinking: Dual processes in reasoning and
judgment. Hove, England: Psychology Press.
Evans, J. St. B. T., & Over, D. E. 2004: If. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. 1991: Deduction. Hillsdale, NJ:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002) Conditionals: A theory of mean-
ing, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review, 109, 646–78.
25
Johnson-Laird, P. N., Byrne, R. M. J., & Girotto, V. (2009) The mental model
theory of conditionals: A reply to Guy Politzer. Topoi, 28, 75–80.
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (2001) The probabilistic approach to human reason-
ing. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 5, 349–57.
Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. 2007: Bayesian rationality: The probabilistic ap-
proach to human reasoning. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Politzer, G. (2007) Reasoning with conditionals. Topoi, 26, 79–95.
Politzer, G. (2009) Could it be the case that if I am right my opponents will be
pleased? A rejoinder to Johnson-Laird, Byrne and Girotto. Topoi, 28, 81–5.
Siegel, M. E. A. (2006) Biscuit conditionals: Quantification over potential literal
acts. Linguistics and Philosophy, 29, 167–203.
Sperber, D., & Wilson, D. 1995: Relevance, communication and cognition. Ox-
ford: Blackwell. (Original work published 1986)
Stalnaker, R. (1968) A theory of conditionals. In N. Rescher (Ed.), Studies in
logical theory (pp. 98–112). Oxford: Blackwell.
26
